The Tamil Tigers

The recent assassination of Sri Lanka's charismatic, though controversial, Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar (73), threatens to ruin an already fragile peace process and a three-year-old ceasefire between the government and the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, demanding a separate
homeland for the minority Tamils in a majority Sinhala island nation.

In a scenario, where the two sides have not met in two years to talk peace, the latest murder, coming as it does after a string of political assassinations, can, it is feared, put the clock back by several years, when a long civil war between the Tamil Tigers and the government forces had unleashed a reign of terror, administrative confusion and economic slide.

The LTTE is well known to be ruthless towards whom it views as its adversary, and Kadirgamar, despite being a Tamil himself, was a strong critic of the Tigers. He completely disapproved of the militant group's method of annihilation under its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran.

Prabhakaran and his followers saw Kadirgamar as a traitor, who in the late 1990s led a successful campaign in world capitals to have the Tigers outlawed as terrorists. By then Tiger assassins had already claimed hundreds of lives, including those of a Sri Lankan President and a former Indian Prime Minister.

In 2003, Kadirgamar bitterly opposed the ceasefire, but could not do much because he was in the opposition then. About six weeks ago, he had urged his President Chandrika Kumaratunga, to establish a modicum of democracy in the LTTE-controlled north-east region.

The Tigers capitalized on the ceasefire to establish a de-facto administrative machinery in the north-eastern part, the predominantly Tamil populated area where Prabhakaran has been wanting to carve out an independent State for his ethnic folk.

The Government officers posted in the north-east could never function: they had to take orders from the LTTE, which collected taxes and maintained its police force. What is more, the Tigers virtually converted the ceasefire line into an international boundary, issuing visas to those wanting to travel beyond the "border" into Sri Lanka.

At the same time, the LTTE strengthened itself militarily. It was heavily rearming itself, and even built an air wing. Prabhakaran' s chosen men were sent globetrotting on a public relations exercise. The supremo himself played host to foreign dignitaries who came to his jungle hideout. It seemed
to matter little to the visitors that the LTTE had been branded a "terrorist outfit" by India, Britain and the U.S., and that the United Nations has been expressing concern over the Tigers' policy of recruiting children for its war.

In the final analysis, it now appears after Kadirgamar's death that the Tigers had never given up their demand for full autonomy. And their actions left nobody in doubt. Their blatant abuse of children (who were even kidnapped and sent to war), violence against Muslims in the north-east and
the lynching of police officials were undoubtedly aimed at taking the LTTE towards a separate homeland.

And, while the government remained responsible by not violating the ceasefire, by being accountable to its citizens and international opinion, the Tigers were not bound by any such norms. They were free to pursue their goal. If at all they agreed to "greater autonomy within a Federal setup," it now appears that this was merely a ploy to divert attention and buy time.

Sadly, Prabhakaran fails to realise that by killing Kadirgamar, he has pushed his luck too far. For the world at large and Colombo in particular, truth seems to have hit now. The worst suspicion has been confirmed: the Tiger never changes its stripes, as the cliché goes. And whatever hope there remained now looks like illusion.