News
 International
 National
 Embassy News
 Arts & Living
 Business
 Travel & Hotel
 Medical Tourism New
 Taekwondo
 Media
 Letters to Editor
 Photo Gallery
 News Media Link
 TV Schedule Link
 News English
 Life
 Hospitals & Clinics
 Flea Market
 Moving & Packaging
 Religious Service
 Korean Classes
 Korean Weather
 Housing
 Real Estate
 Home Stay
 Room Mate
 Job
 English Teaching
 Translation/Writing
 Job Offered/Wanted
 Business
 Hotel Lounge
 Foreign Exchanges
 Korean Stock
 Business Center
 PR & Ads
 Entertainment
 Arts & Performances
 Restaurants & Bars
 Tour & Travel
 Shopping Guide
 Community
 Foreign Missions
 Community Groups
 PenPal/Friendship
 Volunteers
 Foreign Workers
 Useful Services
 ST Banner Exchange
  National
Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant Remains Operational
Special Contribution
By Victor Cha
CSIS Korea Chair
Overview of the northern section of the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant as of March 22, 2020

Key Findings

•Recent satellite imagery shows that the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant remains operational and continues to be updated, despite the absence of any nuclear testing by North Korea since 2017.

•This facility is critical as it is the sole known source of feedstock for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) used for the production of highly enriched uranium for North Korea’s advanced nuclear weapons program.

•Its dismantlement would be an essential component of any meaningful denuclearization agreement.

•These commercial satellite images and the full CSIS Beyond Parallel report to follow next month are among the first to
provide details about this element of North Korea’s nuclear program.

•Located 45 kilometers from the DMZ, the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant represents a critical component within North Korea’s nuclear research and weapons development programs as it has been the sole known producer of uranium concentrate (yellowcake) in the country since the mid-1990s, when it superseded the Pakchon Pilot Uranium Concentrate Facility.

•The plant’s importance to the North Korean leadership and its critical position within the nuclear research and weapons development programs is attested to by the fact that scarce human and financial resources have been consistently allocated to actively maintain, refurbish or modernize the plant since 2003, and probably since its construction.

•Given the current level of development and activity observed at the plant and its associated facilities, it is highly likely to remain active for the foreseeable future.

•Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to visit the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant since 1992, satellite imagery and open source material indicate that the plant is operational and although production tempo has fluctuated—due to maintenance and modernization requirements, the needs of the nation’s nuclear programs, the operational status of its reactors and gas centrifuge plants and the availability of electricity—it has proceeded relatively steadily.

•Given known North Korean industrial practices, observed waste storage practices, and health and safety concerns raised by defectors and outside observers, there are numerous health, safety and environmental issues surrounding its operations.

Overview

The full CSIS Beyond Parallel report on the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant will follow next month. This overview along with the full report are among the first to provide details about this element of North Korea’s nuclear program.

The Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant (38.318369 N, 126.432360 E) is located in Pyongsan-gun (평산군, Pyongsan County), Hwangbuk-do (황북, North Hwanghae Province), approximately 45 kilometers from the DMZ and 96 kilometers northwest of Seoul—the capital of South Korea. Since approximately 1990 it has occupied an critical role in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (North Korea) nuclear research and weapons programs as the sole known provider of uranium oxide (yellowcake) to these programs for fuel fabrication or enrichment. While the information remains to be verified, experts, defectors and early South Korean sources estimate that the yellowcake produced by the plant contains 80% triuranium octoxide (U3O8) by weight. According to what the North Koreas told Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, during his May 1992 familiarization visit, the plant also produces other products such as vanadium and nickel.

During the early-1990s, both Chon Chi-pu, reportedly the chief engineer of Yongbyon Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant, and Kim Tae-ho, a defector who worked on a “waste water disposal team” at the Pyongsan plant have stated that the yellowcake produced at Pyongsan was shipped to the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Facility where it was ultimately used to produce fuel assemblies for the 5MWe and IRT reactors. Today, it also provides the feed stock for both uranium hexafluoride (UF6) production for the Centrifuge Enrichment Plant and likely for future fuel assemblies to be used in the Experimental Light Water Reactor.

Control and subordination of the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant is challenging to delineate. Kim Tae-ho, a defector who worked at the plant, has stated in several May 1994 press conferences that while the plant was managed by the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, it was under the direct control of the direct control of the Korean Workers’ Party’s Machine Industry Department’s Second Economic Committee – specifically, the Second Economic Committee’s 5th Machine Industry Bureau. If correct, it is unclear what roles the Academy of National Defense Sciences’ Nuclear Bureau and State Academy of Sciences and its Hamhung Branch play. The Ministry of Mining Industry’s is believed to operate the mining complex but it is likely under the direct control of the direct control of the 5th Machine Industry Bureau.

Due to its critical position within the nation’s nuclear program it is believed that security for the facility (and the associated mining complex) is provided by a combination of the Ministry of State Security and the Guard Command—directly subordinate to Kim Jong-un.

While it is unclear if the subject came up during the abortive on Feb.28, 2019 Hanoi Summit, the dismantlement of the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant should be an essential component to any meaningful future “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” nuclear agreement between the United States and North Korea.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); author for IHS Markit (formerly the Jane’s Information Group); and publisher and editor of KPA Journal. Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, senior imagery analyst for 38 North at Johns Hopkins SAIS, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center.



Related Articles
    No Significant Activity Observed in N. Korea's ...
    Sharp Focus: A Unique View of the Sinpo ...
    Sharp Focus: A Unique View of the Mayang-do ...
    Sinpo South Shipyard Update: North Korea Moves ...
    N. Korea Shows Signs of Reprocessing Activity ...
    Business as Usual: North Korea Restarts ...
    Two Years since Singapore: Did Kim Outplay ...
    Singapore Summit Assessed by Victor Cha
    N. Korea Announces Successful Hydrogen Bomb ...
    Reports of Another High-Level Execution in ...
    US President Obama to Visit S. Korea April ...
    North Korea Abducts American Senior Citizen
    S. Korea President Park Geun-Hye Holds Summit ...
    N. Korea Threatens to Strike the United States
    CSIS Korean Chair Victor Cha Analyzes North ...
    South Korea Elects President Park Geun-Hye
    North Korea’s Successful Rocket Launch
    North Korea’s Second Rocket Launch in 2012
    Shake-up in Pyongyang
    The Death of the DPRK Leader
    Restart of U.S.-DPRK Negotiations
    S. Korea Wins Bid to Host 2018 Winter Olympics
    Beijing Acts Like North Korea's Defense Lawyer ...
    "America's First Pacific President" Attends ...
    Succession in North Korea
    Jimmy Carter’s Mission to North Korea
    The Aftermath of the Cheonan
    North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il’s Visit to ...
    The Sinking of the ROK Navy Vessel Cheonan
    Obama's North Korea Conundrum"
    Pyongyang Deserves Same Treatment as Seoul
    "Seoul Government Needs to Conduct Its Own ...

Other Articles by Prof. Victor Cha
     Biden-Moon Summit: Rejuvenating and ...
     Sinpo South Shipyard Update: North Korea ...
     N. Korea Shows Signs of Reprocessing ...
     Business as Usual: North Korea Restarts ...
     CSIS Commission on the Korean Peninsula: ...


Dr. Victor Cha is Korea Chair of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). He earned his MA from Oxford, and Ph.D. from Columbia. Many books he authored include the award-winning author of "Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle." As prolific writers of articles on int'l relations in such journals as Foreign Affairs and The Washington Quarterly, he also interacts frequently with CNN, NYT, and Washington Post as well as Korean media.

 

back

 

 

 

The Seoul Times Shinheungro 25-gil 2-6 Yongsan-gu, Seoul, Korea 04337 (ZC)
Office: 82-10-6606-6188 Email:seoultimes@gmail.com
Copyrights 2000 The Seoul Times Company  ST Banner Exchange